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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
v. 
MLPH LEROY MENZIES, Case No. 16324 
Defendant-Appellant 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant, RALPH LEROY MENZIES, appeals from the 
conviction of the crime of Aggravated Robbery in the Third 
Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The appellant, RALPH LEROY MENZIES, was found guilty 
by a jury before the Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr. , Judge 
presiding, of the crime of Aggravated Robbery on February 6th, 
1979, and was thereafter sentenced to be committed to the Utah 
State Prison for the indeterminate term as provided by law. 
~ 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of his conviction and a dismissal. 
ln ther alternative counsel seeks to have the matter remanded to 
"he court and a new trial ordered in the above entitled matter. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
In the evening of the 17th day of July, 1978, 
a Valfoa Lealaitafea was driving a taxi during the course of 
his regular employment. He stopped at a location on approximately 
Fourth East and Seventh South, in Salt Lake City, to pick up 
a fare. A person got into his taxi and shortly thereafter 
pulled or produced a weapon which he pointed at Mr. Lealaitafea. 
The victim, Mr. Lealaitafea, subsequently identified 
the defendant, Ralpy Leroy Menzies, as the person who he picked 
up in his cab on that occassion. According to Mr. Lealaitafea's 
testimony, he was asked to turn over his money, and that he did 
so while the gun was pointed at him. After giving up most of 
his money, Mr. Lealaitafea attempted to grab the gun, at which 
point it went off, severly injuring his arm. The perpetrator of 
the crime left the taxi and escaped on foot. 
~Vhile he was recuperating from his injury sustained 
in the robbery, the victim was shown a photographic array on 
two occassions. On the first of the two occassions, he selected 
the picture of the defendant, Ralph Leroy Menzies, as being 
someone who had a similar hair style. On the second occassion, 
he was once again shown a photographic array, which contained 
a picture of the defendant, and on that occassion he selected 
the picture of the defendant as the person who committed the crime 
Subsequent to the two photographic identifications, the victim 
made several in court identifications of the defendant, Ralph 
Leroy Menzies. 
Toward the latter part of July, 1978, the defendant 
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was arrested on an unrelated charge. Following his arrest 
he was confined for a period in the Salt Lake County Jail. 
The State called Louis Jaramillo to the stand and he testified 
that on the holiday weekend, just before the twenty-fourth of 
July, he had the occassion to meet Mr. Menzies in jail.(R. 136) 
He further stated that during the period thatthey occupied the 
same cell together that he had occassion to talk to Mr. Menzies, 
and that Mr. Menzies stated that he had been involved in a robbery 
wherein a Samoan or Tongan cab driver had been robbed, and that 
he had had to "blow him away". (R. 138) 
Detective William L. Abbott, police officer for 
Salt Lake City Police Department, testified that he had on two 
occassions showed photographs to the victim and that both of 
those photographic arrays included photographs of the Appellant, 
Ralph Leroy Menzies. Detective Abbott testified that on the 
first occassion the victim picked out the photograph of Ralph 
Leroy Menzies, but said only that the victim looked similar in 
some ways to the person who committed the crime, and that he 
had had similar hair and face. The Detective stated that the 
victim did not identify Mr. Menzies' photograph on that occassion. 
(R. 153) Detective Abbott testified that he took approximately 
seven photographs on that first occassion from a bulletin board 
which included ten or twelve photographs, and further, that he 
had not retained those photographs, and didn't remember which 
individual's pictures were involved infue first array. 
Detective Abbott further stated that on the second 
occassion, the victim did make a positive identification of the 
Appellant as the perpetrator of the crime. On August 11th, 1978, 
-3-
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Detective Abbott stated that the second photographic array 
contained only one picture that had also appeared in the first 
photographic array, and that picture was the picture of Ralph 
Leroy Menzies, the Appellant. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE JURY TO RECEIVE 
THE IN COURT IDENTIFICATION OF THE DEFENDANT BY THE 
VICTIM VALFOA LEALAITAFEA TO BE CONSIDERED BY THE JURY 
The appellant moved for suppression of the identification 
made by the victim in court and elsewhere based on the prejudice 
resulting from bias and prejudicial photographic arrays shown 
to the victim at an earlier time. A hearing on the appellant's 
motion was held before the Honorable David K. Winder on 
October 18, 1978. Following a hearing on the motion the court 
denied the defendant's motion to suppress the identification 
and allowed an in court identification by the victim to occur. 
During the course of the motion to suppress the identification 1 
counsel for the appellant called to the stand Detective Abbott 
who testified that on two occasions he showed photographic 
arrays to the victim in connection with this case. The victim 
failed to make any identification on the first occasion but did 
identify a photograph of the defendant on the second occasion. 
Detective Abbott testified that on the first occasion 
he showed to the victim a total of seven photographs. Included 
in that group of photographs was a photograph of the defendant. 
The detective selected the phptographs to be shown to the victim 
from a group of 10 or 12 photographs which appeared on the bulletin 
-~-
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board of the Detective Division. (T.l71-2) The detective 
stated that he did not save the array of photographs that he 
used on that occasion, that he did not remember whose photograph 
were included other than the photograph of the appellant and one 
John Sloan, that he did not recall the appearance of the remaining 
individuals beyond the fact that they were white males with 
similar hair (T.l64). On that occasion the victim made no 
identification from the photo array, but indicated that there 
was something familiar about the photograph of Ralph Menzies. 
(T.l75) Detective Abbott then returned all of the photographs 
to the bulletin board from once they came, there exists no record 
of those photographs, who those photographs were of or where 
those photographs went following the showing to the victim in this 
case. 
Approximately two weeks later Detective Abbott provided 
the victim with a second group of photographs. On this occasion 
there were eight photographs which the detective preserved after 
the photographic array. (T.l77) On the second occasion these 
photographs were drawn from a group of approximately 200 photographs 
and were picked by the detective to represent similar individuals. 
< 
So far as the detective was able to say only one of the photographs 
from the first line-up reappeared in the second photo array and 
that was the photograph of Ralph Menzies, the appellant. (T.l79) 
On this occasion the victim identified the photograph of Mr. Menzies 
as being the person who had robbed him. 
The victim subsequently appeared in court and identified 
the appellant in person at the preliminary hearing and at two 
-5-
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subsequent trials. It is the appellant's contention that based 
on the prejudice surrounding the exhibition of photographs that 
at the photographic identification on the occasion of the showing 
of the second photographic array should be suppressed and that 
the subsequent in court identification should be suppressed as 
well, for the reason that they are based on and stem from 
the original prejudicial photographic array. 
The United States Supreme Court has considered the issue 
of identification from photo arrays in the case of Simmons v. United 
States, 390 U.S. 377, 88 S.Ct. 1967, 19 L.Ed. 2d 1247 (1968). 
While the court in that case approved of the photographic line-up 
procedure,the court also pointed to significant potential dangers 
in the use of such photographic arrays. As the court stated 
in that opinion. 
"It must be recognized that improper employment of photographs 
by police may sometimes cause witnesses to err in 
identifying criminals. A witness may have obtained only 
a brief glimpse of a criminal, or may have seen him under 
poor conditions. Even if the police subsequently follow 
the most correct photographic identification procedures 
and show him the pictures of a number of individuals without 
indicating whom they suspect, there is some danger that 
the witness may make an incorrect identification. This 
danger will be increased if the police display to the 
witness only the picture of a single individual who generally 
resembles the person he saw, or if they show him the 
pictures of several persons among which the photograph of a 
single such individual recurs~or is in some way 
emphasized. The chance of misidentification is also 
heightened if the police indicate to the witness that they 
have other evidence that one of the persons pictures 
committed the crime. Regardless of how the initial 
misidentification comes about, the witness thereafter is 
apt to retain in his memory the image of the photograph 
rather than of the person actually seen, reducing the 
trustworthiness of subsequent lineup or courtroom 
identification. (Italics added) 390 U.S. at 383. 
Subsequent to the Simmons case Utah State Supreme Court 
has confronted photo show-ups on several occasions. In the case 
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State v. Perry, 27 Utah 2d 48 492 P.2d 1349 
. . . the circumstances of the individual case should 
be scrutinized carefully by the trial court to see 
whether in the identification procedures there was 
anything done that should be regarded as so suggestive 
or persuasive that there is a reasonable likelihood 
that the identification was not a genuine product 
of the knowledge and recollection of the witness, but 
was something so distorted or tainted that in fairness 
and justness the guilt or innocence of an accused 
should not be allowed to be tested thereby. 
The Utah Supreme Court once again approved of police procedure 
involving a state line-up in the case of State v. Wettstein, 
28 Utah 2d 295, 501 P.2d 1084 (1972) holding in that particular 
case: 
There was substantial, confident evidence to support 
the determination of the trial court that the identification 
testimony had an independent source. Id. supra at page 297 
More recently in the case of State v. Jenkins, 523 P.2d 
1232 (1974), the Utah Supreme Court had occasion to once again 
app.rove the use of photographs but once again acknowledging 
the necessity that the photographic presentation be fair and 
impartial. Quoting from Justice Crockett's opinion in that 
case at page 1233: 
It is true that either procedure (line-up or photographic 
arrays) is subject to being used either fairly or 
unfairly. The desirable objective and the requirement 
is that the identification shQuld be conducted in a fair, 
reasonable and impartial manner with a view to 
protecting the innocent and finding the guilty. 
(Parenthesis added and footnotes omitted). 
Other courts have examined the appropriateness of photographic 
arrays since the Simmons case cited supra. While the courts have 
generally found police procedure within acceptable guidelines, 
on several occasions various courts have found that photographic 
procedures did violate due process and in those cases identification 
-7-
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testimony was suppressed. In the case of United States v. Sanders, 
479 F.2d 1193 (D.C. Cir. 1973) pre~trial identification evidence 
was suppressed where a photo display in which the defendant was 
the only one with facial hair and a stout appearance was followed 
by a line-up at which the defendant was the only one repeated 
from the photograph. The Third Circuit disapproved of eye-witness 
testimony in a case where a witness was asked to pick the photo 
of the person who looked "most like" the individual who committed 
the crime from a group of photos containing other individuals 
who were much younger and did not resemble the defendant. United 
States v. Keller, 512 F.2d 182 (1975). 
Appellant suggests that the fundamental unfairness of the 
pre-trial photographic identification made of the defendant falls 
into the category of a police procedure which has a substantial 
risk of leading to the eventual mis-identification of a suspect 
in court. The appellant further suggests that it was precisely 
that kind of inappropriate, biased presentation in the form of a 
photo array to the victim in this case that lead to the identificatior. 
of the appellant. The police procedure in the above entitled 
case was not in many cases upheld b~ this court and other anpellate 
courts a simple matter of showing to a victim of an alleged crime 
several photographs of a similar nature to determine if the victim 
would select any one of the photographs as the perpetrator of the 
crime. Rather it must be remembered that in this case the police 
showed two sets of photographs to the victim. Only one of which 
photographs appeared in both photographic arrays and that was the 
photograph of the defendant. 
-3-
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To further compound the unfairness of the procedure the 
police officer who showed the test failed to preserve the photographs 
from the initial photographic showing. Because of his actions 
the trial court as well as the appellate court will never be able 
to detect the potential bias and suggestiveness of that first 
photo array since it can never be reconstructed. However, 
it may be assumed from the officer's testimony that the seven 
photographs were selected from approximately 12 that the range 
of characteristics in terms of hair, facial hair, skin coloration, 
facial structure, etc. was very wide and that the selection of the 
photographs for that initial show-up did not provide a neutral 
setting for the display of the photograph of the appellant, 
who was at that time a suspect. 
Further from the detective's testimony at the hearing to 
suppress the identification we know that as well as the victim's 
testimony at trial, we know that he was unable to identify the 
man who robbed him from that first set of photographs, which 
according to all accounts contained the photograph of the:,appellant. 
It was not until the occasion of the second photographic array 
that the victim identified the appellant's picture. That 
identification occurred from a grou~ of photographs which contained 
only one photo in common with the earlier show-up. The factual 
situation presented here is much similar to the case of United 
States v. Sanders, supra wherein the court held that a line-up 
at which the defendant was the only person repeated from the earlier 
photographic array violated due process and suppressed testimony 
regarding the pre-trial identifications. Appellant suggests that 
-9-
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the photographic identification and the subsequent in-court 
identification based on the earlier identification was a 
violation of due process in two respects. First the pre-trial 
identification occurred as the victim was observing the second 
set of photographs which set contained only one photograph from 
the first array and that was the picture of the defendant, that 
itself is highly suggestive creating a potential hazar for 
misidentification. 
Secondly, the destruction of the photos from the fist 
photographic show-up prevents review either by the trial court 
or by the appellat court of any potential biases, inaccuracies 
or suggestiveness of that initial line-up. As the court said 
in Simmons at page 384: 
" ... We hold that each case must be considered on its 
own facts, and that convictions based on eye-witness 
identification at trial following a pre-trial identification 
by photograph will be set aside on that ground only if 
a photographic identification procedure was so impermissibly 
suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood 
of irreparable misidentification." 
The appellant in this case has been deprived of the right 
to have that matter determined at a trial court by virtue of the 
police officer's destruction of these photographs upon which 
subsequent identifications are bas~. To allow such and 
identification stand would be to say to police officer that the cure 
for a biased and suggestive photographic array would be simple 
destruction of the photographs following the showing to the victim o; 
witnesses. If such behavior were condoned by the courts it would be 
mandate that constitutionally improper photo show-ups could be cured 
the simple destruction of the evidence that would have showed its 
-10-
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constitutional infirmity. 
The potentially favorable nature of the evidence from the 
missing photographs is apparent. The photos themselves could 
show clearly the broad variety and suggestive nature of the 
photographs on their face. No amount of testimony or analysis 
after the fact in the absence of those photographs could adequately 
capture the bias and suggestive nature for the jury as well as 
for the court. 
Several general rules have been developed in the area of 
suppression of favorable evidence. The Utah Supreme Court in 
State v. Stewart, 544 P.2d 477 (Utah 1975), announced the rule 
governing nondisclosure of evidence favorable and material to 
criminal defendants: 
0 0 (S)uppression or destruction of evidence by those 
charged with prosecution, including police officers, 
constitutes a denial of due process if the evidence 
is material to guilt or innocence of the defendant in 
a criminal case. . . " 
Id. at 478. 
The rule in Stewart is even broader in scope than that of 
the leading United States Supreme Court case in the field of 
suppression of evidence, BFady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 10 L.Ed. 
2d 215, 83 S.Ct. 1194 (1963), in which the Court said: 
" 
"We now hold that the suppression by the prosecution of 
evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due 
process where the evidence is material either to guilt 
or punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith 
of the prosecution." 
~- 373 U.S. at 870 
Stewart's extension of the duty to disclose to police officers 
has also been approved by the United States Supreme Court in 
its opinion in Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 31 L.Ed. 
-11-
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2d 104, 92 S.Ct. 763 (1972): 
"Horeover, whether the nondisclosure was a result of 
negligence or design, it is the responsibility of the 
prosecutor. The prosecutor's office is an entity 
and as such it is the spokesman for the Government." 
Id. 405 U.S. at 154. If the police were not burdened with a duty 
to disclose, the ~rosecutor could successfully claim that police 
officers, who did the principle investigation of a case, had 
withheld exculpatory information from him, and, therefore, that 
he had no duty to disclose the material. This would leave the 
defendant with no assertable claim when his right to a fair trial 
had been clearly abridged. To impede due process disclosure in 
this fashion 'lvould effectively abrogate the fundamental fairness 
objectives sought by the many constitutional decisions requiring 
disclosure of favorable and material evidence to the defendant. 
For this reason, 
" ... The police are also part of the prosecution, 
and the taint on the trial is no less if they, rather 
than the State's Attorney, were guilty of nondisclosure." 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
"The duty to disclose is that of the state, which 
ordinarily acts through the prosecuting attorney; but 
if he too is the victim of police suppression of the 
material information, the state's failure is not on 
that account excused. We cannot condone an atte~pt to 
connect the defendant with ths crime by questionable 
inferences which might be refuted by undisclosed and 
unproduced documents in the hands of the police." 
Barbee v. Warden, 331 F.2d 842, 846 (4th Cir. 1964). 
The destruction of evidence case is akin to the above 
analysis. The Utah Supre~e Court has not dealt with this exact 
situation, but in State v. Stewart, 554 P.2d 477 (Utah 1975) our 
Court did deal with a problem similar in nature. In that case, 
-12-
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the defendant was convicted of Unlawful Distribution of a Controlled 
Substance and during the trial there was evidence presented that 
the undercover agent who purchased the narcotics had a tape recorder 
on his person during the transaction. That tape was requested 
during the trial by defense counsel and the request was denied. 
In ruling on that contention our Court said that: 
"Hhile it is true that a deliberate suppression or 
destruction of evidence by those charged with the 
prosecution, including police officers, constitutes 
a denial of due process if the evidence is material to 
the guilt or innocence of the defendant in a criminal 
case, there is no showing in this case that the 
material recorded on the tape in question was vital 
to the issue of whether or not the defendant was guilty 
of the charge." 
This was so, the court held, because the defendant specifically 
denied having made the sale and denied even having seen the 
undercover witness on the day the sale was supposedly to have 
occurred. Our court issued guidance in that case when it said: 
"We think it advisable that those charged with investigation 
and prosecution of crime retain intact all records and other 
evidence pertaining to the case until it is finally disposed 
of. By adopting such a practice, a claim of unfairness by 
one charged with a criminal offense would be groundless." 
Thus, our court has recognized that a destruction of evidence 
that is material to guilt or innoce~ce is a denial of due process 
of law. In that case, however, there was no showing the tape would 
have been beneficial. The defendant there denied completely even 
having met the undercover agent on the date in question. In 
this case, the simplicity of the preservation of the photos in the 
original photographic show-up, as well as the importance of that 
evidence to show subsequent identification bias dictate that the failure 
to follow the advice of our Supreme Court should warrant one of the 
-13-
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remedies sought by the defendant. 
In this case, of course, defendant has not shown that the 
evidence would have been favorable to him. Such a burden and task 
under the circumstances is obviously completely impossible as the 
evidence has been destroyed. Defendant contends that he need not 
"prove" the material would be favorable to him as he would in a 
situation where there was evidence merely suppressed, but not destrov, 
In State v. Brewer, 549 P.2d 188 (Ariz. App. 1976), the Court 
dealt with a conviction in a fraud case. The defendant alleged that 
certain evidence was destroyed prior to the trial which may have tendl 
to establish his innocence. The Court examined that contention and 
noted that the destroyed documents had been transcribed and that 
transcript had been made available to the defendant. The court 
in discussing the destruction of evidence said that to be in 
violation of due process; 
"The State must know, or have reason to know, that the 
evidence being destroyed was either material or favorable 
to the accused." 
Thus, in that case, there was no required shmving that the material 
be favorable if it was destroyed. It would be enough if the defendan~ 
could show either that it was material or favorable and that the 
State knew or had reason to know of that materiality. Defendant 
submits that the very nature of_the evidence in question must lead 
the court to the conclusion that the State through its' agent knew 
that the results of the photographic array (where identification 
is a crucial element of the offense) would be material. This is the 
case, the defendant contends, where as the court said in In Re 
Cameron, 439 P.2d 633 (Cal. 1968); 
-14-
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"The police or prosecution may disable the State from 
ever giving a defendant a fair trial if they have lost or 
destroyed or otherwise made unavailable vital defense 
evidence." 
In Cameron, the California Court noted that if such a situation arose, 
a new trial should not be held, but the defendant should be discharged. 
The State of Washington dealt with a similar case in State 
v. Wright, 557 P. 2d 1 (Hash 1976). In that case the defendant 
YE 
was convicted of First Degree Murder for the killing of his wife. 
Her badly decomposed body was found in a room and had apparently been 
k dead for approximately 3 weeks. After removing all of the clothing 
from the body, due to its' highly infected and unpleasant nature, 
the police burned all clothing before any analysis for blood or any 
other tests were performed. The police gave permission to a relative 
of the deceased to remove and burn the bedding and mattresses and 
other items from the room. This was all accomplished before the defendant: 
had been appointed an attorney but after he was arrested and before 
any scientific tests of any kind were performed. In that case, 
the defendant prior to trial made a motion to dismiss the charge 
on the basis of a denial of due process of law. The court began 
by discussing "what is material" and reached the inescapable 
~ 
conclusion that such evidence could have been material, but that 
it lvas impossible to tell 111hether or not the evidence would be 
favorable to the defendant because it had been destroyed. The court 
quoted a leading case in the area, United States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d 
~42 (D.C. Car. 1971). The Washington Court quoted as follows: 
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"The purpose of the duty [to disclose] is not simply to 
correct an imbalance of advantage whereby the prosecution 
may surprise the defense at trial with new evidence; 
rather, it is also to make of the trial a search for 
truth informed by all relevant material, much of which 
because of imabalance in investigative resources, will 
be exclusively in the hands of the government." 
Further, quoting from Bryant, the Court said that: 
"Before a request for discovery has been made, the duty 
of disclosure is operative as a duty of preservation." 
In Wright, the defendant point up several possibilities 
for the use of evidence and the court held that by so doing, he 
demonstrated a reasonable possibility that the evidence destroyed 
by the police was material to guilt or innocence and favorable. 
The court then went on vlith the more difficult task of 
fashioning a remedy. They noted there have been situations where 
the prosecution has made "an earnest effort" to preserve the 
materials, but noted this was not the case. Even though the 
evidence was not destroyed for the specific purpose of hindering 
the defense, the motive of the prosecution or the police is not 
determinative. The purpose of the duty of preservation "is not 
to punish the police, but to insure a fair trial for the accused." 
The court noted the destruction was intentional as there was 
no effort made to preserve the evidence and further noted that 
neither "administrative convenience nor inadequate facilities 
justifies a failure to preserve potential evidence." Therefore, 
the defendant was denied due process of law. The court noted that 
usually in a suppression type case a new trial can be ordered and thE 
defendant can be given the supnressed evidence. Of course, 
that is not possible in this case, so the court saw no alternative 
other than to reverse the conviction and dismiss the charges, then 
went on to discuss some of the nractical problems that would be 
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be created for police and gave suggestions as how to handle that. 
Defendant contends that his case is very much similar in that 
the evidence was clearly intentionally abandoned even though there 
is no contention made that it was done as a purpose to hinder defense. 
Administrative ease is not a sufficient reason for denying evidence. 
There is no possible way defendant can now show that the evidence 
would have been favorable, but it clearly was material and it 
might have been favorable. Defendant contends this court should 
follow the Wright rationale and hold that the destruction of such 
endence denies defendant due process of law and dismiss the charges 
against him. 
In State v. Trimble, 402 P.2d 162 (N.M. 1965) the court 
dealt with a destruction of evidence case much weaker than defendant's. 
In that case the defendant, a minister, was convicted of First 
Degree Murder. It was defendant's theory at trial that he 
acted in self defense. He claimed to have in his possession a letter 
and some tapes which he was about to show the victim \vhen the victim 
attacked the defendant and necessitated the shooting. After the 
shooting the police obtained a search warrant and obtained the letter 
and tapes and thereafter these were ~never seen again. The defendant 
claimed they were helpful to his defense of self defense in that they 
l·lould have contained what he said they did and corroborated his 
trial testimony. The State argued that the existence of the 
letter and the tape were explained by defendant on the stand and 
his testimony was not contraverted and so there was not prejudice. 
The court initially began by saying that the situation was similar 
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to the suppression of favorable evidence by the State, although 
not exactly alike. The court went on to hold over the argument of 
the State that even though the suppression was not willful, 
the same rule applies. The court noted that the presence and 
existence of the letter and its' assistance to defendant in 
corroborating his version were, "too apparent for argument." Therefo:. 
under the facts of the case, the court had no alternative, but to 
reverse and set aside the sentence. 
The situation in defendant's case is like the situation 
brought to light in the California case of Peonle v. Hitch, 
527 P.2d 362 (Cal. 1974). In that case a person was convicted of 
drivinR while under the influence of alcohol and the results of 
a breathalyzer test were admitted at this trial. The defendant 
sought to analyze the test ampoules which had been used while 
the breath test had been given by police officers. Those had been 
destroyed after the test by the police officer. California Court 
began its' analysis and said that the results of such test 
clearly constitute material evidence and went on to say that 
evidence; 
"Substantially affecting the aredibility of the 
results of the test would appear to be material and 
the suppression of such evidence would deny defendant 
a fair trial." 
They noted, of course, that the critical evidence was not before 
them so it was not for the court to determine whether the 
evidence was or was not favorable to the issue of the 
defendant's guilt or innocence. The court likened the 
situation in that case to a situation where an undercover informant 
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Eo: 
is known by the police on a drug sale, but the name is not 
revealed for the defendant to locate and interview the witness. 
The court noted that in those situations where the defendant has 
shown a reasonable possibility that the informant could give 
gavorable evidence his identity must be disclosed or the case 
dismissed. Similarly, the court in Hitch said that given the 
availability of the test ampoule and its contents there is a 
reasonable possibility that it would constitute favorable evidence 
on the issue of guilt or innocence and if that is shown then such 
evidence must be disclosed. If the evidence was available, it 
clearly must be disclosed. The court in that case gave prospective 
effect only to their rule because of the immensity of cases dealing 
with a breathalyzer and test ampoules in California alone. The 
rule to be followed would be that the test results would be suppressed 
on the part of the State if the evidence were not preserved and 
discoverable by defense. 
In fashioning a remedy defendant contends that the court 
must weigh the significance of the lost or destroyed evidence 
and the conduct which lead to that destruction. Further, the court 
should consider the ease or difficulty of retaining such evidence 
~ 
in determining what remedy ought to apply. The evidence and 
materiality has already been discussed and is, as the court in 
Trimble, said; "too apparent for argument." Similarly the case 
of preservation of the evidence is apparent. There is simply no 
justification for the failure to preserve this critical identification 
evidence, 
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CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the case law is clear that the showing of 
photographic arrays is subject to the constitutional requirements 
of due process of law. The evidence which would have revealed that 
clearly has been destroyed by the police who had custody of it. 
The principles of due process mandate that in the absence of 
the preservation of such evidence, dismissal of the case against 
appellant is the only affective remedy. Appellant therefore 
requests that the case against him be dismissed. 
Respectfully submitted this ___ day of March, 1980. 
BRADLEY P, RICH 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc. 
333 South Second East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Appellant 
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